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Rancie`re and Contemporary Political
Problems
The Political: Relational or Foundational?
Through a critical interrogation of the relation between political
philosophy and politics Rancie`re elaborates a notion of the political
characterized in terms of division, conflict and polemic. For Rancie`re
the received view which sees relations between systems of speculative
thought and the real world of politics as necessarily divergent is
misleading. Despite claims to the contrary each side of the relation
shares a common understanding of politics as epiphenomena of an
originary unity which each seeks to maintain against the persistence
of conflict and division. In effect, philosophy ‘puts an end to the
political, by employing metaphorical resources which at once distance
it utterly from empirical politics and allow it to coincide exactly with
it’.1 For Rancie`re the solidarity of philosophy and politics is subsumed
within the notion of the police which designates an activity through
which each individual is maintained in an allotted place within the
order of society. Thus: ‘The basis of the politics of the philosophers is
the identity of the principle of politics as an activity with that of the
police as a way of determining the partition of the perceptible that
defines the lot of individuals and parties’.2 In short, the solidarity of
philosophy and politics is the coincidence of an order of being and an
order of ruling derived from and reducible to a unity prior to both.
One might say that for Rancie`re the relation between philosophy
and politics is a response to the problem of the political in which
philosophy comes off worst. At best philosophy enjoys a distinctly
under-laboured relation with politics.
Against the identity of philosophy and politics Rancie`re affirms a
notion of the political as the primacy of irreducible conflict between
the police and the paradoxical ‘part which has no part’. Rancie`re
provides a positive expression of this paradox by reactivating the
proletarii as the Latin word for ‘prolific people—people who make
children, who merely live and reproduce without a name, without
being counted as part of the symbolic order of the city’.3 The political
is a conflictual relation which arises from the limit or exhaustion of
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the police, or from the inevitability of the fact that there is always
one more to be counted and placed in some way within the symbolic
order. Here Rancie`re relies on a mathematical principle of equality in
which each is one and only one and which is opposed to a geometrical
principle of hierarchy which distributes some ones as more important
and powerful than other ones, and which is represented through the
symbolic order in which each one finds its place within the unity of
the One. Hence the political is a conflict between two heterogeneous
processes in which mathematics dislocates geometry. Rancie`re refers
to the location of the encounter between these two processes by
reference to a further paradox of ‘the nonplace as place’ (PIS: 66),
and which is not a matter of counting or proportion. Furthermore,
to indicate the dimension of agency Rancie`re links the problem
semantically and pragmatically to a term from an even older language,
the Greek ochlos as the turbulent, disruptive and indeterminate mass
or mob which serves to verify that the existence of the demos is never
unified and homogeneous (OSP, 31–9). The demos is always more
or less than itself as it does not require the guarantee of a ground to
which it could be reduced or a transcendental place from which it
could be derived. Hence the ochlos demonstrates that the demos is not
one or One.
If the above massively condensed and partial summary of Rancie`re’s
position is reasonably accurate with respect to at least some of
its decisive elements then an issue arises which stems from the
importance given to the relation between philosophy, politics, police
and ‘symbolic order’ on the one hand and proletarii, ochlos, ‘non-place
as place’ on the other. The issue is that Rancie`re’s position seems
to imply that the political arises from the existence of that which
cannot be symbolized by the police, or which can only be symbolized
through terms that succeed in designating its anonymity. One might
go even further and suggest that for Rancie`re the political is that
which cannot be symbolized by the coincidence of being and rule.
If this is the case then it is open to the accusation that disagreement
is little more than an objection to the indignity of being overlooked
or misnamed, motivated by the sense that some undesirable politically
ordered disadvantages are built into the predicament. In other words,
the relational notion of the political would simply be subsumed as
an interruption in a prior consensual dialectic of recognition and
obligation from which it is otherwise excluded. In fact, this is the
view of Deranty: ‘Rancie`re’s fundamental political concern is the
denial of recognition experienced by the dominated’.4 Deranty argues
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sensitively and in detail that Rancie`re’s political thought makes a
positive contribution to the ‘ethics of recognition’ but concludes that
a certain ambivalence remains. Referring to the subjectivization of
the political Deranty points out:
Obviously, the disruptive subjects could not achieve the reconfiguration of the
field of communal experience in the same ontological, organized, hierarchical
manner that social configuration is achieved. They must retain their disruptive status.
They appear as subjects only in the pragmatic reconfiguration of the field of
experience, through the disruption of the ontology of the social order. They
appear here and now as subject of word and action, but they are not ontological
entities (JRC, 151, emphasis added).
Or, we might add, not entities as such. Not one, and not the other.
Deranty’s point uncovers a problem which is not pursued. For
recognition to matter the non-ontological and non-symbolic status of
the political must be denied. How then is the political to be thought
of in a way which maintains its non-ontological and non-symbolic or
aleatory status? The question is posed in order to deny the possibility
that disagreement is merely a claim to the enjoyment of the advantages
of the symbolic order through subordination to the police. That is to
say, to maintain the paradoxical dimension of the political. The stakes
of the problem are laid out in Zˇizˇek’s recent sympathetic criticism of
Rancie`re’s work. Along with Badiou, Balibar, and Laclau and Mouffe,
who are lumped together on the basis of a common Althusserian
inheritance, Rancie`re’s notion of the political seems ‘to fall into
the trap of ‘‘marginalist’’ politics, accepting the logic of momentary
outbursts of an impossible radical politicization that contains the seeds
of its own failure and has to recede in the face of the existing Order’.5
For Zˇizˇek the function of Rancie`re’s notion of the political is self-
limiting in that it must maintain a residual marginal character as the
demonstration of its own authenticity which entails ‘an ambiguous
attitude towards its politico-ontological opposite, the police Order of
Being: it has to refer to it, needs it as the big enemy (‘Power’) which
must be there in order for us to engage in our marginal/subversive
activity’, adding immediately that ‘the very idea of a total subversion
of this Order (‘global revolution’) is dismissed as proto-totalitarian’
(TS, 234). In short, for Zˇizˇek the notion of the political which
Rancie`re proposes is compromised because mathematical equality
requires to be recognized by geometrical hierarchy and thus needs
a place within it. The relational notion of the political is merely an
effect and not a cause.
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Ultimately Zˇizˇek rejects a relational version of the political as merely
a ‘game of hysterical provocation’ (TS, 238) which is inferior to the
heroic revolutionary task of establishing a new positive symbolic order.
This can be done on the basis of the knowledge that the apparent
ahistorical status of the existing symbolic order is itself an illusion
because the truth of the order of Being which it establishes rests on
a prior political moment, a foundation in which a positive order of
being is instituted. Hence for Zˇizˇek the political is the invention
of the One and politics is about which one is the better One. The
justification for Zˇizˇek’s critique and the foundational notion of the
political which it affirms is the presumption of the coincidence of the
authority of the symbolic, the capacity of the police to order as a
basis of rule, and the philosophical elaborations which support it. In
other words, the issue concerns the presumption of a miracle which,
for Rancie`re, is perhaps more properly understood as a historically
specific response to the political. This paper will begin by looking at
the elaboration of the political in Rancie`re’s thought to see if such
a miracle has a place, a task which will help us to assess the validity
of Zˇizˇek’s criticisms. The paper will then go on to discuss some
contemporary accounts of the components of this miracle in order to
assess whether Rancie`re’s relational notion of the political and Zˇizˇek’s
foundational criticisms have a place.
The political is not symbolic
Zˇizˇek’s foundational account of the political is animated by the
conviction that a symbolic order of being is necessary in order to
guarantee both social reproduction and its pathological consequences,
and a lot more besides. For Zˇizˇek the capacity of the symbolic to order
derives from an ability to mediate metaphysics and politics or, in more
formal terms, that which is general and that which is particular. This
seems to be the assumption underlying Zˇizˇek’s notion of the political,
wherein Hegel’s subordination of the symbol of GermanRomanticism
to the conventional nature of the sign purged of any naturalism,
intuition or sensuousness is combined with the transformation of
the Durkheimian anthropology of the symbolic through structuralist
semiotics. The symbolic is an order of signs which establishes the
objectivity of the social and which, through Lacan’s account of mis-
identification, is translated into the subjectivity of experience. By
reactivating the strict Althusserian doctrine that ideology is necessary
and eternal even if its content is contingent, Zˇizˇek commits to a
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politics of producing illusions through which subjects are reconciled
with their epistemological poverty.
Immediately it should be noted that it is unlikely that Rancie`re’s
thought can be entirely assimilated to the assumptions with which
Zˇizˇek’s critique makes sense. After all, one of Rancie`re’s deepest criti-
cisms of the Althusserian project was that it attempted to establish ‘the
coexistence of two heterogeneous conceptual systems: that of historical
materialism and that of a bourgeois sociology of the Durkheimian
type’.6 These two systems were opposed politically and ideologically
through the insistence that a properly Marxist theory of ideology was
derived from The Preface to the Contribution to a Critique of Political
Economy and was concerned with the forms in which a struggle is
fought out, and had nothing to do with an eternal structure in which a
‘metaphysical theory of the subject (in the form of a theory of illusion)
is linked with a sociology of systems of representations’. A Marxist
theory of ideology ‘is no more a theory of the subject, than a theory
of science or a theory of ‘‘society’’’ (OTI, 9). Although it would be
crude to try and derive Rancie`re’s recent political thought from an
earlier position it would be fair to say that the thematics of struggle
is continuous with a relational notion of the political as division
and polemic. Nevertheless, given this distance it is important to try
and specify what it is about Rancie`re’s recent political thought that
provides a basis for Zˇizˇek’s criticisms. Attempting to do so requires a
more direct analysis of the way in which the notion of the symbolic
is used.
We can begin by pausing and rewinding to take a closer look at
Rancie`re’s explanation of the political. The ambiguity of Rancie`re’s
notion of the political is condensed in the following statement which
offers three reasons why there is politics:
First, because there are names which deploy the sphere of appearance of the people,
even if in the process such names are apt to become separated from ‘things’;
second, because the people are always too numerous or too few compared with
the form of their manifestation; and third, because the name of the people is at
one and the same time the name of the community and the name of a part of—or
rather a split in— the community. The gap between people as community and
people as division is the site of a fundamental grievance. At the outset, it is not
the king but the people who have a double embodiment. (OSP, 96–7)
Arguably the first and second reasons are compatible with the struc-
turalist logic of ‘symbolic efficiency’ because a finite economy of signs
is restricted in comparison with the possibilities of signification and is
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thus empirically destined to fail. But is the conflictual aspect of this
failure automatic, a necessary component of the dialectic of recog-
nition and obligation? That is to say, where is the non-ontological
political dimension? Rancie`re provides it with the third reason which
introduces the notion of division and which does not follow from the
first two reasons but interrupts them. There is no logical link between
the notion of the symbolic, including that which is not symbolized,
and the notion of division. By itself there is no reason why a grievance
should arise in the gap between the name of the community and its
divided referent. Either the connection is made through a metaphys-
ical equivalence between the possibility of non-symbolization and the
existence of division, which would entail a common reference to a
foundation, albeit negatively, or the connection arises from the force
of the evidence of an empirical example. In which case, symbol is
subordinated to allegory and the ontological status of the symbolic in
both Romanticism and Durkheimianism is relegated. In fact, this is
exactly what happens in Rancie`re’s argument with the introduction
of the notion of a ‘double embodiment’ to qualify the third reason for
politics, and which is borrowed from Lefort’s use of Kantorowicz’s
thesis of ‘The King’s Two Bodies’ in order to explain the emergence
of the modern form of the political from a pre-modern structure of
order centred on the institution of monarchy.7
It is worth looking at Lefort’s argument in a little more detail in
order to uncover how it produces a specific relation between the
symbolic and the political. The circularity of divine right establishes
the fact that the King is simultaneously spiritual and temporal by
way of analogy: ‘You are to me, as I am to God’. The body of the
King grounds a proportional geometrical rule of order. It is both
mathematical one and geometrical One in which each other one finds
its place. Yet Lefort’s analysis of the political does not locate its origin
within the double embodiment of the King. Rather, the political is
something which happens to this structure which has the effect of
demonstrating both a distinction between the spiritual and temporal
properties of the body of the King and the arbitrariness of their link.
This is the revolutionary act in which the physical body of the King is
split, introducing a gap which demonstrates that the King is not One
but only one. There are two major consequences. Firstly, a foundation
or centre is displaced by a relation as the act does not originate from
within the structure of double embodiment but from something
external to it which does not have any positive designation. Secondly,
the distinction between the spiritual and the physical becomes the
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distinction between the symbolic and the real, empty markers without
positive properties. For Lefort, this literal dislocation gives rise to the
following decisive features of political modernity:
Power appears as an empty place and those who exercise it as mere mortals who
occupy it only temporarily or who could install themselves in it only by force or
cunning. There is no law that can be fixed, whose articles cannot be contested,
whose foundations are not susceptible of being called into question. Lastly, there
is no representation of a centre and of the contours of society: unity cannot now
efface social division.8
The place of power is empty, a gap which separates the symbolic
and the real. Emptiness cannot be symbolized precisely because it is a
literal event which symbolizes nothing, but it can be depicted, repre-
sented, allegorized. Hence strictly speaking power is not symbolic.
Consequently, modernity dislocates the relation between power and
authority. There is no longer a generality of power. Henceforth
the political becomes the polemicization of the symbolization of
power. Indeed, Lefort promotes this activity as one of the democratic
virtues of modernity although recognizes that it can easily fall into
its opposite, the totalitarian menace in which the substantial body of
authority is reinvented and power is symbolized. Democracy is all
about preserving the gap between the symbolic and the real.9
Rancie`re does not follow the logic of Lefort’s argument completely,
instead transposing it as an attribute of the people itself prior to the
institution of the King. In so doing it is hard to see how a political
dimension goes with it. By themselves, irrespective of how they are
named, and irrespective of the referential failure of their names, the
notions of community and people do not entail any dimension of
power and authority and thus the possibility of a grievance predicated
on division. It is only when one realizes that the division between the
name of the people and the name of a part of the people is a division
which is not named because both people and its part possess the same
name that a political dimension becomes thinkable and the doubleness
of the people makes sense. The political becomes thinkable insofar as
‘the part which has no part’, the ochlos, demonstrates the sameness of
the name of the people and a part of the people. Which means that
ochlos is a name for the division within the name of the people. The
ochlos transforms a spontaneous experience of shared living-together
into an order of being, a symbolic order, which reveals the difference
between the name and its referent, the general and the particular. So
for practical purposes it doesn’t really matter which came first, the
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people or the King. All that matters is that the political establishes
a polemical relation which reveals the difference within either of
these names.
Yet Rancie`re does not follow Lefort’s argument to the letter simply
because of a wish to affirm the priority of the people over the
King. According to Zˇizˇek, the reason for Rancie`re’s reluctance to
emphasize the modern form of the political is an opposition to the
idea and practice of a ‘para-politics’ which emerges as a consequence.
In modernity politics is depoliticized as a competition to occupy the
symbolic place of power (TS, 192). This point seems otiose, given
that in light of the distinction between the political and politics the
latter is ‘depoliticized’ by definition. Indeed, both foundational and
relational notions of the political seem to agree on this point. In fact,
Rancie`re’s opposition is to an even deeper consequence of political
modernity which is that society cannot be established by reference
to a positive determination and entails, in Lefort’s memorable phrase,
‘the dissolution of the markers of certainty’ (DPT, 17). Even though
Lefort affirms the priority of division Rancie`re is reluctant to endorse
the consequences of the ‘catastrophe in the symbolic linked to the
disembodiment of the ‘‘double body’’ of the king’ which takes place
in a ‘theater of sacrifice’ (D, 100). The opposition is not that this is
something that cannot be done, but that to do so, which means to
have done so, displaces a polemic between a social body and ‘a body
that now displaces any social identification’ (D, 100). In other words,
the notion of the political as a conflict between the police and a ‘part
which has no part’ becomes untenable. Yet without the interruption of
ochlos no such polemic ever took place and it would not be possible to
think of the people as the division between that which can be named
and that which cannot. So the ambiguity in Rancie`re’s argument
stems from locating the distinction between the people as One and
people as division as prior to the interruption of the ochlos, when in
fact it is this event which produces the distinction. The catastrophe
does not occur within the symbolic. Rather, the catastrophe is that the
symbolic occurs in order to produce the coincidence of philosophy
and politics.
Interestingly, Lefort came to a similar conclusion on the basis of his
own analysis, which was expressed as an ambivalence about the status
of the symbolic. At one level it is a purely functional requirement
which prevents the atomization of society and thus preserves the
vocation of what Rancie`re calls the police. Yet at the same time
the symbolic does not establish social closure but gives rise to ‘an
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endless series of questions’ which have become the agency of the
political (DPT, 228). At which point Lefort reaches a conclusion
posed in the form of a question which Rancie`re takes as a point of
departure. Thus: ‘We have to ask how the philosophical idea of the
One colludes with the image of a united society’ (DPT, 229). For
Lefort this is a matter of the persistence of the ‘theological-political’, a
term commensurate with the coincidence of philosophy and politics
or a foundational notion of the political. Lefort provides no answer
to the question but instead suggests an answer to be avoided because
it would liquidate the political itself. Such an answer would be one
which relegates the political form of modern society to illusion and
replaces ‘the fiction of unity-in-itself with that of diversity-in-itself’
(DPT, 232). So the reluctance to follow Lefort is a strategic decision
which prevents the consequences which for Rancie`re inevitably arise
from political modernity. Yet this is at the price of turning the
response of philosophy and politics into a cause, and which provides
the opportunity for Zˇizˇek’s criticism.10 Yet as the regicide has taken
place perhaps we should have a look at how these consequences have
played out in order to try and determine if they have any political
dimension of value. To do so we shall conclude by examining the
contemporary status of each element of the miraculous trinity of the
police, the symbolic and philosophy in turn.
The end of the police
Here we can turn to consider some orthodox accounts of the decisive
features of contemporary empirical politics. For example, in a review
of texts by some then ‘nouveaux philosophes’ published in 1978, one
year after punk, and translated into English in 1979, Donzelot essayed
some themes grounded in Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’
which proposed a diagnosis of ‘the dominant problem of the moment,
the loss of credibility of political culture’.11 The force of this situation
was characterized in terms of the ‘dedramatization of social conflicts by
eliding the question of assigning responsibility for the origin of ‘‘social
evils’’ and shifting the issue to the different technical options regarding
variations in different parameters required to ‘‘optimise’’ employment,
wages, allowances etc.’ (PPC, 81). Through the collapse of moral
causality the political is progressively subsumed within the social and
the political force of the symbolic becomes obsolescent. Hence the
‘detachment of the political class from the messianic discourse of the
old politics’ is accelerated such that ‘the efficiency of government
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has more to do with an approach based on expertise rather than
with an ability to rouse audiences’ (PPC, 83). Politics becomes a
matter of maintaining a minimum level of cybernetic equilibrium
within circumstances which it does not authorize and disagreement is
reduced to the status of a practical problem in search of a solution.
This does not entail the elimination of ‘ruptural practices’ (PPC, 84)
although their consequences are unintended. The persistence of the
‘sullen resistance of the silent masses or the spectacular resurgence
of the crowd in demonstrations is an opposition to the cultural and
political management of society’ which reinforces the default position
of the State as ‘the guarantor of processes of social regulation’ (PPC,
85). Of course, the politicization of blame plays a huge part in
this scenario.
Recently this analysis has been reinforced by an advocate of the
invention of ‘mediation mechanisms’ managed by the State, such as
the institution of individual mobility restrained by the commitment
to personal financial investment with which to regulate the conflict
between capital and labour.12 For Aglietta, although authority ‘can no
longer be legitimized by a symbolic figurehead or by the invocation
of a transcendent moral value or religious belief’ (CTC, 57) social
inclusion ‘must become’ the ‘categorical imperative of the state’ in
the context of the randomization of the causality of wealth and status
respectively (87). On reflection it is apparent that Aglietta’s moral
optimism is unwarranted as the notion of inclusion entails that the
state must somehow create the conditions for its own legitimacy, yet
it must do so legitimately. In presupposing what has to be established,
the project of ‘inclusion’ replicates one of the core paradoxes of
political modernity, for example the figure of the social contract
which presupposes agreement to subjection in order to demonstrate
the legitimacy of the subjection which it formulates. Yet Aglietta’s
scenario adds a further disabling twist in that without the symbolic
dimension there is no order to be included within. At best inclusion
would be a temporary contingent relation subordinate to the effects
of the actions of finance capital, and this would also hold for its logical
correlate, exclusion. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising
that relations between political systems and their environments are
often described in terms of ‘reinvention’. One can conclude that to
establish an order of being within which each is placed requires an
investment that will never be returned. By the same token, to accept
such an obligation would suggest that the imperative of inclusion is
superfluous precisely because it is imposed by the failure of a causality
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of moral indebtedness, and thus, for Aglietta, of the financial economy
on which its success is supposed to rest, and the games with sticks and
carrots through which the ‘regulative’ imperative is embedded.
The end of the symbolic
What these examples show is that politics proceeds as the attempt
to manage the absence of the One as a place of rule, and thus the
absence of a predetermined distribution of places. Not surprisingly the
consequences of this condition are legible within the symbolic itself
insofar as its function is understood as establishing the identity of the
idea of the One with its referent. These developments serve to reveal
the limits of Zˇizˇek’s positive affirmation of a foundational notion of
the political. The standard objection to this position is that it cynically
replaces one form of terror with another. Zˇizˇek is indifferent to such
complaints. Rather, Zˇizˇek’s anxiety is that the ‘symbolic efficiency’
of the Order of Being has dissolved in the reduction of politics to the
generalized management of the ‘smooth service des biens’. Although
Zˇizˇek’s evidence is drawn from the literature associated with the
sociology of ‘risk society’, the argument is pretty much commensurate
with the diagnoses of Donzelot and Aglietta.13
The broader implications of Zˇizˇek’s explanation of the situation
shifts the stakes away from the hackneyed sixty-eightist problem of
incorporation, commodification and ‘repressive desublimation’, in
which self-authenticating vanguard forces compete with each other
to demonstrate their authenticity, towards a grumpy and curmud-
geonly lament over the passing of the conditions in which the
post-Althusserian notion of the political as foundational ‘act of insti-
tution’ could make sense. Zˇizˇek regrets that the conditions for the
construction of a new symbolic order of Being and thus of the
necessary mediation of ideology have dissolved because the mecha-
nisms of subjectivization through mis-identification which support it
have collapsed. As a psycho-Marxist Zˇizˇek points to the withering
of the Oedipus complex as evidence that ‘the paradigmatic mode
of subjectivity is no longer the subject integrated into the paternal
Law through symbolic castration, but the ‘‘polymorphously perverse’’
subject following the superego injunction to enjoy’ (TS, 248). In the
face of the risks of contemporary capitalist consumer culture there is
no longer any authority to oppose, as the force of ‘symbolic efficiency’
has been liquidated in the institutional collapse of the modern bour-
geois patriarchal family. Social capitals are degraded by the absence of
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‘any symbolic point of reference that would serve as a safe and unprob-
lematic moral anchor’ (TS, 332). The knowledge that the symbolic
is contingent is no longer the exclusive possession of revolutionary
cadres but is embedded reflexively within the post-punk culture of
everyday life. Subjectivity lacks nothing, as an index of plenitude has
become immeasurable. Desire is replaced by drive, crash, and burn.
The end of philosophy
Lastly we should consider the third term in the trinity of the miracle of
coincidence. Although philosophy’s regret over its own impotence or
lack of practical significance is for Rancie`re little more than a deceptive
ruse which defines the genre from its classical Greek origins, on the
basis of evidence consistent with the empirical political examples
given above some influential contemporary versions of the topic are
characterized by the acceptance of the absence of any expectation
that the situation could be overcome. For example, as recently as
1958, at least two years after the invention of Rock and Roll, Arendt
developed the Heideggerian complaint that ‘authority has vanished
from the modern world’ because there is no universally agreed method
that would fill the causal and logical gap between speech and action,
or what Arendt called ‘metaphysics’.14 In this example, the problem
was posed in order to renew political philosophy through a return
to its heritage in order to confront the ‘elementary problems of
human living-together’ (WA, 141), and which elsewhere Arendt
famously argued should be solved by the subordination of speech
and action to a shared common account of an ‘inaugural moment’
precisely because metaphysics is lacking.15 Thus according to a logic
which Zˇizˇek replicated, albeit unknowingly, the order of the One is
invented in a historical moment in order to compensate for an absent
metaphysical foundation, but to which is attributed a causality and
authority which metaphysics would possess if it was available. In this
case empirical politics is subordinated to a description of an example
which is authoritative because it most approximates a philosophical
ideal of politics.
As they say, ‘things have moved on’. Contemporary post-
metaphysical political philosophy recognizes the problem of the gap
between speech and action which Arendt observed, but generally tries
to take a very different tack in order to avoid the doubtful solution to
which it otherwise leads. For example, by building on the experience
of undecidability as a description of deconstruction, the gap itself
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functions as a limit at which the political begins. This direction ends
up with a notion of the political as the point in which being and
authority are without foundation and the solidarity of philosophy and
politics dissolves. Yet it would not be sufficient to confine this position
to the outcome of a critical interrogation of the relation between
political philosophy and politics as it is interrupted by a temporal
dimension which neither can master. Derrida illustrates the point in
a recent interview about the dominance of the media construction of
‘artifactuality’, by reference to the technologically-driven production
of a ‘practical deconstruction of the traditional and dominant concepts
of the state and citizen (and thus of ‘‘the political’’) as they are
linked to the actuality of a territory’ which is currently taking place.16
Under these circumstances a notion of the political grasped as a
foundation which institutes the solidarity of being and authority no
longer makes sense, even if such a thing had actually happened.
Importantly, neither does the police understood as the distribution
of places within the symbolic order, which is why Derrida refers to
the political stakes of ‘practical deconstruction’ in terms of ‘multiple
configurations of mastery without mastery’ which are conditioned
by a logic of ‘exappropriation’ (ET, 37). That is to say, without the
authority of propriety to keep things in place the vocation of the
police is redundant. Typically, for Derrida this is neither a good nor
bad thing in itself. It simply serves to emphasize the contingency of
any ‘part which has no part’ and the impossibility of its reduction to a
measure of political probability.
Conclusion
Under these circumstances a foundational notion of the political is
Quixotic. Is Rancie`re’s relational notion of the political as division a
victim of the same fate? Of course, what has been deconstructed is a
political ontology or order of being, the coincidence of philosophy,
the symbolic and politics. This does not mean that deconstruction
is ochlos, but it does mean that it is something to add, although not
something that can necessarily be counted as one. Perhaps recognition
of the consequences of this point moves the political in the direction
of rhetoric insofar as it suggests a notion of the invention of places,
albeit without an inventory. To explore such an opportunity would
show that the symbolic is only the symbolic and not a diagram of
social relations. This does not make philosophy any more practical but
by the same token it might make it a lot more relational or, to say the
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same thing differently, open to relations which do not pre-suppose
any miraculous coincidence. After all, it is only with respect to the
absence of such an event that one can really talk about the political.
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